

Societe Generale SA – Annual General Meeting of 20 May 2025  
**Responses to written questions from shareholders**

The text of the following questions has been summarised (without changing the meaning) when it is unnecessary to quote them in full to ensure their proper understanding.

**Questions from Ms Annie Degirmencian Evrenian, individual shareholder (questions sent by letter dated 22 April 2025):**

- .....5
- 1) In your integrated report, you state your ambition to be “a leading European bank”. However, your balance sheet is significantly smaller than that of other leading European banks and your market capitalisation lags behind that of your main competitors. Your critical size is therefore a real issue. .... 5
- As the European banking sector continues to consolidate and economies of scale become increasingly decisive for the ability to absorb technological and regulatory investments, how do you explain the viability of your mid-market positioning? ..... 5
- Recent acquisitions such as LeasePlan seem insufficient to bridge this considerable gap with the market leaders. Faced with players such as BNP Paribas and Santander, which benefit from a greater critical mass, or conversely with specialised players who exploit niches with high added value, isn't your group in the uncomfortable position of “falling between two stools”? ..... 5
- What strategic options do you envisage in concrete terms – mergers, transformative acquisitions or a radical pivot towards certain businesses – to solve the problem of critical size, which looks set to compromise your competitiveness and ability to generate an attractive return on investment for your shareholders? ..... 5
- 2) In your integrated report, you mention several strategic partnerships, such as those with AllianceBernstein and Brookfield, which are designed to expand your offering and strengthen your positions in certain markets. However, since the failed merger with Paribas more than 20 years ago, it seems that Societe Generale has never formed a transformative alliance with another major European banking player, unlike many of your continental competitors. .... 5
- In a context where European banking consolidation appears to be necessary in the face of US and Asian giants, how do you explain this persistent lack of structural cooperation? ..... 6
- Is it down to a deliberate strategic decision to maintain your independence at all costs, or does it point to difficulties in identifying partners that are compatible with your corporate culture and business model? ..... 6
- Could you enlighten us on the exact criteria that would apply to any participation by SG in the consolidation of the European banking sector today, if such an opportunity were to arise? ..... 6
- 3) Your integrated report mentions a EUR 1.7 billion investment in IT systems, and the importance of operating efficiency and rigorous processes. However, I have personally encountered a worrying failure in your financial and accounting control procedures: after paying your subsidiary SOGEPROM the 5% balance due on a buy-to-let apartment, or EUR 26,024, it persisted in claiming in court that this amount remained unpaid, even though I had sent proof of the transfer to the Group's General Management and Chairman. This situation raises questions about the reliability of your accounting systems and the apparent lack of coordination between your operational, legal and management departments. .... 6
- Can you explain how a bank of your size, with considerable IT resources, is able to mislead the court about perfectly traceable financial transactions? ..... 6
- More broadly, what concrete measures do you intend to take to remedy these shortcomings, which, putting aside my personal situation, could indicate underlying issues with your bookkeeping and handling of customer disputes? ..... 6
- 4) At the 2024 AGM, in a written response on 21 May 2024 to our questions of 10 May 2024, you described your supervisory framework as being based on “three lines of defence”, which in your own words forms the basis of your operational risk management. However, in my dispute with your subsidiary SOGEPROM over a payment of EUR 26,024, duly made and substantiated by bank statements sent to your General Management and Chairman, all three lines have clearly failed: your subsidiary continues to deny having received this payment before the court, and has appointed a prestigious law firm to defend this false position, jeopardising the Bank's reputation by lying. By taking this position before the court, you are accusing a customer of having lied about these payments, when it is actually the Bank which

is attempting to obtain a judgment fraudulently. No internal control seems to have identified this serious anomaly. This systemic breakdown raises profound questions about the actual effectiveness of your control system: ..... 7

Can you specify exactly which of your three lines of defence failed in this particular case? ..... 7

How do you explain the fact that despite your technological investments of EUR 1.7 billion, something as simple as tracing a payment cannot be done internally? ..... 7

More generally, what structural corrective measures are you going to implement to ensure that such failures, potentially amounting to false accounting, do not happen again? ..... 7

5) In your 2023-2024 integrated report, you state that you consider risk management a core priority, with “three lines of defence” to ensure rigorous control of your business. .... 7

How do you explain then that your subsidiary SOGEPPROM, supported and directed by the Group’s Management and General Secretariat, recently had amended planning permission withdrawn for a major building project of more than 18,700 m<sup>2</sup> in Neuilly-sur-Seine (SNC Neuilly Île de la Jatte), rendering the project unlawful, as evidenced by the judgment of the Administrative Court of Cergy-Pontoise of 21 June 2024? ..... 7

Faced with these challenges and this legal setback, what corrective measures have SOGEPPROM and the Group, which is fully aware of the situation and acting as coordinator, taken? More fundamentally, how could such a failure have gone undetected by your internal control mechanisms, which you describe as exemplary in your report? ..... 7

How do you explain this significant operational shortcoming of your subsidiary and your Group, which reflects a lack of knowledge of basic planning regulations and a failure to monitor operations properly? ..... 7

Faced with this reprehensible situation, how do you explain the fact that the Group’s General Management and General Secretariat, which are directly responsible for managing litigation, are maintaining this position without taking corrective measures, instead mobilising the considerable resources of a CAC 40 group by paying several law firms to take legal action against owners who find themselves the victims of a situation created by your company, having never offered to cancel the property sales and reimburse them? ..... 7

Isn’t seeking an injunction in clear contradiction with your public pledges in terms of preventive risk management and corporate social responsibility, as described in your CSR policy? ..... 7

6) Aside from the persistence of SOGEPPROM, together with the Group’s General Management, Chairman and Board of Directors, who seem to condone this situation, does this mishandling of a property matter mean that we face more serious issues? ..... 7

How can you explain such obstinacy on the part of the Group’s senior leadership team in a case that, according to the administrative court, presents obvious discrepancies and documented risks? ..... 7

Societe Generale’s management is asked to provide specific answers rather than generalisations, out of respect for the shareholders and the trust they place in you by investing in your Group ..... 7

## **Questions from the NGO Reclaim Finance (questions sent by email dated on 30 April 2025): ..... 8**

### **Energy financing ratio ..... 8**

The energy financing ratio, a key metric of a credible climate strategy, is increasingly popular in the financial sphere. .... 8

Your peers BNP Paribas and Crédit Agricole, for example, have incorporated it into their climate strategies. BNP Paribas has published the ratio of its fossil fuel exposures to its low-carbon energy exposures since 2024. It has also stated its goal of achieving a 90:10 ratio between its “low-carbon” and “fossil” exposures, respectively, by 2030. At the same time, in its latest annual results, the Crédit Agricole Group disclosed the change between 2020 and 2024 in the ratio of its fossil fuel extraction assets under management to the share of low-carbon energy assets under management. .... 8

Furthermore, the recent publication of the Institut Louis Bachelier (ILB) sets out the basic methodology for effectively calculating that ratio. At the very least, it should: ..... 8

Cover the entire fossil fuel value chain, from exploration and production to end-use. .... 8

Take into account all financing, including bond issuances, with a flow-based approach. .... 8

Include, in the “sustainable” part of the ratio, financing for electricity grids and storage, while excluding fossil technologies and bioenergy (biomass, biogas and biofuels). .... 8

The first two points are also the approach taken by BloombergNEF (BNEF) in its reports on the “Energy Supply Banking Ratio”, the third edition of which was published last January. This method is endorsed by Santander, which claims to use the ratio calculated by BNEF in its publications. JPMorgan Chase also published its ratio last December, which includes bonds. .... 8

Does Societe Generale intend to align itself with its peers and show that it is serious about committing to a carbon-neutral pathway by publishing its energy financing ratio, while taking into account the ILB's recommendations and the three points mentioned above?8

## **Financing for Adani .....9**

According to the latest data from the Global Coal Exit List, Adani still plans to increase its coal-fired power generation capacity by 20,550 MW over the next four years in India. This is more than its current coal-fired power generation capacity of 17,510 MW. It also plans to expand its coal mining operations in India and Australia from 11.2 million tonnes per year produced today to more than 100 million tonnes per year in the future. These projects are completely contrary to the recommendations of climate science, which calls for a halt to all coal expansion and the phasing out of thermal coal by 2040 worldwide, in order to meet the 1.5°C target. .... 9

In addition, the Toxic Bonds Network published a report which collates evidence that funding into Adani Green Energy, supposedly the renewable energy arm of the Indian conglomerate, is being redirected, through collateralisation and related party transactions, to other Adani Group entities directly responsible for coal expansion projects. .... 9

In addition, the Adani Group has been embroiled in several international scandals in recent years. First it was accused by Hindenburg Research, an American investment research firm known for its short selling, of being engaged in a brazen stock manipulation and accounting fraud scheme over the course of decades. Gautam Adani has also just been indicted by US prosecutors for conspiring with executives of a company formerly listed in New York to devise a USD 265 million scheme to bribe Indian officials to boost their solar energy business. .... 9

Adani and its executives were also charged with making false and misleading statements to investors and lenders in the United States about the company's anti-corruption commitments and practices, while raising funds from them. .... 9

Societe Generale participated in a USD 409 million bond issue for Adani Energy Green in March 2024. It was reportedly in the running for another bond issue initially scheduled for late 2024, before being cancelled. .... 9

Given the internal financial flows of the Adani Group mentioned above, this recent transaction runs counter to Societe Generale's public objective of excluding coal developers. It can therefore be considered misleading for third parties and meets the EU regulators' definition of greenwashing..... 9

In view of all the abovementioned points about financial flows and links between Adani Green and the other coal development subsidiaries of the Adani Group, does Societe Generale promise to end its participation in bond issues and loans to the Adani Group and its subsidiaries, including Adani Green? ..... 9

## **Question from Mr Romain Feraud, individual shareholder (question sent by email on 4 May 2025):..... 10**

Why do the latest annual and half-yearly management reports of the Societe Generale FCPE not provide a breakdown of the portfolio, and all the transactions carried out during the relevant period? ..... 10

## **Questions from Ms Elisabeth Achard, individual shareholder (questions sent by email on 12 May 2025): ..... 10**

One of SG's priorities is customer satisfaction, a major contributing factor to SG's reputation. .... 10

What measures are being taken to improve Customer Relations in terms of staffing, training, skills and freedom to investigate in all departments, services and branches? ..... 10

How were the problems resolved? ..... 10

Is it reasonable to have to send two registered letters to Customer Relations, eventually receiving a reply three months later, which failed to address any of the points raised in the letters and wrongly blamed me for the cancellation of the SG bank cheque declared invalid by the Department of Public Finances for Haute-Vienne?..... 10

## **Questions from: Friends of the Earth France, a non-profit association (questions sent by email on 7 May 2025):11**

1. Response to the open letter signed by more than 700 students calling on the Bank to withdraw from the Mozambique LNG project11

More than 700 students signed the open letter published last month calling on Societe Generale to withdraw from the Mozambique LNG gas mega-project. .... 11

In the letter, we set out the reasons for our indignation at the actions of TotalEnergies in Mozambique, as well as the human rights violations and allegations of atrocities committed against civilians by soldiers paid by the French oil major to protect its site..... 11

As you well know, this is a pivotal moment for the future of the gas project. At the end of April, TotalEnergies announced that it planned to restart Mozambique LNG by mid-2025. Societe Generale, which in 2020 agreed to participate in the USD 14.9 billion loan to develop the project, now has a say in the matter: with funding having been frozen for four years, TotalEnergies needs the approval of its lenders if it wants to revive Mozambique LNG..... 11

So far, TotalEnergies has managed to obtain approval from two far-right governments: Italy under Giorgia Meloni and the United States under President Trump. But as we said in our open letter, “this disregard for the climate and human lives is not the only issue”. Other governments, including the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, have launched investigations into serious allegations of abuses allegedly perpetrated in 2021 by Mozambican security forces at the TotalEnergies gas site. .... 11

Societe Generale can be on the right side of history. Following this call to action, we are asking you today for an answer: Will Societe Generale continue to support the Mozambique LNG project and its relaunch, or is it committed to withdrawing from it? ..... 11

If Societe Generale refuses to heed our urgent appeal, we will continue to oppose you and will do our utmost to stop you from recruiting new customers and employees from the lucrative student market. .... 11

2. Your bank’s presence in higher education..... 11

Societe Generale is developing an aggressive strategy of communicating with and canvassing students and graduates, as well as seeking to influence the higher education community. This translates as a financial presence and partnerships with numerous higher education and research establishments and with multiple players in student associations. This presence is not without reward for the Bank, allowing it to greenwash its image and giving it a stranglehold on the younger generations we represent, through the recruitment of new customers and employees. .... 11

This strategy raises questions when compared with Societe Generale’s business as usual and its position as a leader in fossil fuel financing. We refer once again to its support for Total’s Mozambique LNG project. As students concerned about climate change and human rights, as well as the independence of our universities and associations and the quality of our courses and the teaching provided, we are troubled by the dominant position of certain partners who continue to finance the climate chaos in which we are immersed. .... 12

To understand its strategy and to identify Societe Generale’s presence within the student community, we would like you to be transparent about your involvement by disclosing: ..... 12

- The list of partnerships that Societe Generale has with places of higher education (schools and universities), specifying the establishments, types of support and amounts involved, where applicable; ..... 12
- The list of academic courses and research and teaching chairs funded by Societe Generale, including all public and private institutions, specifying the courses and chairs, establishments and amounts involved; ..... 12
- The list of student associations and activities financed by Societe Generale – orientation weekends, festive events and galas, student offices, etc. – specifying the establishments, activities or associations and amounts involved; ..... 12
- The list of campus events involving Societe Generale – conferences, promotional stands, stands at recruitment fairs, judging panels, tutored projects, coaching sessions, etc. – specifying the establishments and activities involved. .... 12

#### **Questions from Ms Kelly Shields of the NGO Shareaction (question sent by email on 14 May 2024): ..... 12**

To whom it may concern,..... 12

We would like to submit this question to be answered by the board of directors in writing and published publicly, as part of Societe Generale’s 2025 AGM. .... 12

This question is on behalf of ShareAction and relates to how the bank deals with human rights issues and ensures respect of Indigenous Peoples’ rights. Banks are expected under international guidance to ensure clients have human rights grievance mechanisms and to either participate in a grievance mechanism themselves or establish their own. These independent bank-level grievance mechanisms are crucial, given communities may not feel mechanisms established by companies are accessible, effective, and safe. They can be a useful mechanism for Indigenous Peoples to flag or remedy potential rights violations. Indeed, the importance of bank-level grievance mechanisms is increasingly recognised in law. The French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law requires all large companies, including banks, produce a vigilance plan that includes an alert mechanism for severe human rights and environmental impacts. Under this law, BNP Paribas is currently facing legal action for allegedly failing to establish an adequate vigilance plan to prevent violations of human rights.... 12

European peers are already moving in earnest to strengthen their protections. In 2024, ABN AMRO established a Human Rights Remedy Mechanism, allowing people who have experienced harm to enter into dialogue with ABN AMRO and any clients subject to the complaint. This is a mechanism tailored for resolving human rights related grievances. Its separation from whistleblowing processes enables the bank to institute a specific approach to governance, transparency, and mediation, building trust and supporting the fundamental rights of complainants..... 13

We note Societe Generale has established a whistleblowing system, but this is not adapted to the unique needs of external stakeholders including local communities or Indigenous Peoples. A more tailored mechanism is needed to be considered effective under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Will the bank consider developing a human rights grievance mechanism to bolster its approach to human rights risks? ..... 13

**Questions from Ms Annie Degirmencian Evrenian, individual shareholder (questions sent by letter dated 22 April 2025):**

**1) In your integrated report, you state your ambition to be “a leading European bank”. However, your balance sheet is significantly smaller than that of other leading European banks and your market capitalisation lags behind that of your main competitors. Your critical size is therefore a real issue.**

**As the European banking sector continues to consolidate and economies of scale become increasingly decisive for the ability to absorb technological and regulatory investments, how do you explain the viability of your mid-market positioning?**

**Recent acquisitions such as LeasePlan seem insufficient to bridge this considerable gap with the market leaders. Faced with players such as BNP Paribas and Santander, which benefit from a greater critical mass, or conversely with specialised players who exploit niches with high added value, isn't your group in the uncomfortable position of “falling between two stools”?**

**What strategic options do you envisage in concrete terms – mergers, transformative acquisitions or a radical pivot towards certain businesses – to solve the problem of critical size, which looks set to compromise your competitiveness and ability to generate an attractive return on investment for your shareholders?**

**Response of the Board of Directors:**

As part of its roadmap, Societe Generale's strategy consists of several strands to prepare the Group for the future:

- To be a strong bank: strengthening our capital base has been a priority for our roadmap, with an increase in our target CET1 capital ratio to 13% post-Basel IV by 2026. This target was achieved back in Q1 2025, more than a year ahead of schedule, with a CET1 ratio of 13.4%. This level of capital reinforces the Group's strength and strategic flexibility.

- To be a bank with sustainable and profitable performance: the Group is pursuing an ROTE profitability target set at between 9% and 10% by 2026; it has already made progress towards achieving this target with a reported ROTE of 11.0% in Q1 2025. Total shareholder return was also boosted by the increase in our share price.

Achieving sustainable and profitable performance is supported by several initiatives to improve operating leverage, simplify our model and seize opportunities for revenue growth by investing so that our core franchises can go from strength to strength:

- In cost terms, the Group is implementing projects to structurally reduce the cost base across all its businesses, the effects of which are gaining momentum: rollout of a new retail banking operating model in the networks in France; synergies within Ayvens with the integration of LeasePlan; simplification of our business portfolio and head office functions in France; streamlining of IT systems and processes.

- In revenue terms, the Group is taking various steps: implementing growth initiatives to fast-track the development of its digital bank BoursoBank; creating a global leader in financing and mobility solutions with Ayvens; strengthening corporate and investment banking franchises with the launch of Bernstein in equity research and brokerage; forging a partnership with Brookfield in infrastructure finance.

In terms of size, at end-2024, with a balance sheet of around EUR 1,600 billion, SG ranked among the five largest banks in continental Europe. Not only that, but its business franchises are recognised market leaders.

With this solid foundation, the Group is continuing to execute its strategic roadmap with clear objectives, building on the tangible results achieved and looking ahead to the actions planned for the coming months.

**2) In your integrated report, you mention several strategic partnerships, such as those with AllianceBernstein and Brookfield, which are designed to expand your offering and strengthen your positions in certain markets. However, since the failed merger with Paribas more than 20 years ago, it seems that Societe Generale has never**

**formed a transformative alliance with another major European banking player, unlike many of your continental competitors.**

**In a context where European banking consolidation appears to be necessary in the face of US and Asian giants, how do you explain this persistent lack of structural cooperation?**

**Is it down to a deliberate strategic decision to maintain your independence at all costs, or does it point to difficulties in identifying partners that are compatible with your corporate culture and business model?**

**Could you enlighten us on the exact criteria that would apply to any participation by SG in the consolidation of the European banking sector today, if such an opportunity were to arise?**

**Response of the Board of Directors:**

Societe Generale's roadmap sets out the route to strengthening and simplifying the Group, based on solid capital, controlled costs, high profitability and a diversified but cohesive business model, allowing us to prepare for the future and continue to invest in our core franchises.

In general, transformative mergers are rare in the banking sector for several reasons:

- industrial reasons, linked to the economic relevance of such combinations and the possibility of extracting synergy in terms of costs and revenues, the aim of any deal always being to create lasting value for the various stakeholders,
- supervisory reasons, mainly due to the additional capital requirements triggered by increased size and complexity, cross-border liquidity management and operational risks of integration,
- regulatory reasons, linked to the various authorisations needed,
- strategic reasons, owing to the specific role of the banking industry, as well as risk management, with a structural need to share and spread risks among several banks, which structurally limits the economic relevance of mergers within our industry.

**3) Your integrated report mentions a EUR 1.7 billion investment in IT systems, and the importance of operating efficiency and rigorous processes. However, I have personally encountered a worrying failure in your financial and accounting control procedures: after paying your subsidiary SOGEPROM the 5% balance due on a buy-to-let apartment, or EUR 26,024, it persisted in claiming in court that this amount remained unpaid, even though I had sent proof of the transfer to the Group's General Management and Chairman. This situation raises questions about the reliability of your accounting systems and the apparent lack of coordination between your operational, legal and management departments.**

**Can you explain how a bank of your size, with considerable IT resources, is able to mislead the court about perfectly traceable financial transactions?**

**More broadly, what concrete measures do you intend to take to remedy these shortcomings, which, putting aside my personal situation, could indicate underlying issues with your bookkeeping and handling of customer disputes?**

**Response of the Board of Directors:**

It is not for the Board of Directors or the General Management to answer a question at an AGM regarding the personal interests of a customer or counterparty in a specific legal case.

SOGEPROM's counsel have approached Ms Evrenian's counsel to discuss the points in relation to the legal proceedings she mentions.

4) At the 2024 AGM, in a written response on 21 May 2024 to our questions of 10 May 2024, you described your supervisory framework as being based on “three lines of defence”, which in your own words forms the basis of your operational risk management. However, in my dispute with your subsidiary SOGEPROM over a payment of EUR 26,024, duly made and substantiated by bank statements sent to your General Management and Chairman, all three lines have clearly failed: your subsidiary continues to deny having received this payment before the court, and has appointed a prestigious law firm to defend this false position, jeopardising the Bank’s reputation by lying. By taking this position before the court, you are accusing a customer of having lied about these payments, when it is actually the Bank which is attempting to obtain a judgment fraudulently. No internal control seems to have identified this serious anomaly. This systemic breakdown raises profound questions about the actual effectiveness of your control system:

Can you specify exactly which of your three lines of defence failed in this particular case?

How do you explain the fact that despite your technological investments of EUR 1.7 billion, something as simple as tracing a payment cannot be done internally?

More generally, what structural corrective measures are you going to implement to ensure that such failures, potentially amounting to false accounting, do not happen again?

#### **Response of the Board of Directors:**

We refer you to our previous answers.

5) In your 2023-2024 integrated report, you state that you consider risk management a core priority, with “three lines of defence” to ensure rigorous control of your business.

How do you explain then that your subsidiary SOGEPROM, supported and directed by the Group’s Management and General Secretariat, recently had amended planning permission withdrawn for a major building project of more than 18,700 m<sup>2</sup> in Neuilly-sur-Seine (SNC Neuilly Île de la Jatte), rendering the project unlawful, as evidenced by the judgment of the Administrative Court of Cergy-Pontoise of 21 June 2024?

Faced with these challenges and this legal setback, what corrective measures have SOGEPROM and the Group, which is fully aware of the situation and acting as coordinator, taken? More fundamentally, how could such a failure have gone undetected by your internal control mechanisms, which you describe as exemplary in your report?

How do you explain this significant operational shortcoming of your subsidiary and your Group, which reflects a lack of knowledge of basic planning regulations and a failure to monitor operations properly?

Faced with this reprehensible situation, how do you explain the fact that the Group’s General Management and General Secretariat, which are directly responsible for managing litigation, are maintaining this position without taking corrective measures, instead mobilising the considerable resources of a CAC 40 group by paying several law firms to take legal action against owners who find themselves the victims of a situation created by your company, having never offered to cancel the property sales and reimburse them?

Isn’t seeking an injunction in clear contradiction with your public pledges in terms of preventive risk management and corporate social responsibility, as described in your CSR policy?

#### **Response of the Board of Directors:**

As previously stated, we cannot answer personal questions at an AGM. SOGEPROM’s counsel have approached Ms Evrenian’s counsel to discuss the points in relation to the legal proceedings she mentions.

6) Aside from the persistence of SOGEPROM, together with the Group’s General Management, Chairman and Board of Directors, who seem to condone this situation, does this mishandling of a property matter mean that we face more serious issues?

How can you explain such obstinacy on the part of the Group’s senior leadership team in a case that, according to the administrative court, presents obvious discrepancies and documented risks?

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### **Response of the Board of Directors:**

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### **Questions from the NGO Reclaim Finance (questions sent by email dated on 30 April 2025):**

#### **Energy financing ratio**

The energy financing ratio, a key metric of a credible climate strategy, is increasingly popular in the financial sphere.

Your peers BNP Paribas and Crédit Agricole, for example, have incorporated it into their climate strategies. **BNP Paribas has published the ratio** of its fossil fuel exposures to its low-carbon energy exposures since 2024. It **has also stated its goal** of achieving a 90:10 ratio between its “low-carbon” and “fossil” exposures, respectively, by 2030. At the same time, in its **latest annual results**, the Crédit Agricole Group disclosed the change between 2020 and 2024 in the ratio of its fossil fuel extraction assets under management to the share of low-carbon energy assets under management.

Furthermore, the **recent publication** of the Institut Louis Bachelier (ILB) sets out the basic methodology for effectively calculating that ratio. At the very least, it should:

Cover the entire fossil fuel value chain, from exploration and production to end-use.

Take into account all financing, including bond issuances, with a flow-based approach.

Include, in the “sustainable” part of the ratio, financing for electricity grids and storage, while excluding fossil technologies and bioenergy (biomass, biogas and biofuels).

The first two points are also the approach taken by BloombergNEF (BNEF) in its reports on the “Energy Supply Banking Ratio”, **the third edition** of which was published last January. This method is endorsed by Santander, which **claims to use the ratio** calculated by BNEF in its publications. JPMorgan Chase also **published its ratio** last December, which includes bonds.

Does Societe Generale intend to align itself with its peers and show that it is serious about committing to a carbon-neutral pathway by publishing its energy financing ratio, while taking into account the ILB’s recommendations and the three points mentioned above?

### **Response of the Board of Directors:**

To date, **the Group has not published a target financing ratio between sustainable energy and fossil fuels.**

To the best of our knowledge, there is no agreed definition of the financing ratio that would allow us to measure the changes on a comparable basis:

- A few years ago, the International Energy Agency introduced the concept of a ratio comparing the investments needed in low-carbon energy and those in fossil fuels. This is a ratio measuring the major energy balances within the economy.
- We have observed the publication of financing ratios by various financial institutions. However, we are not aware of any consensus on methodology within the financial community.
- Lastly, we have taken note of the guidelines on the management of banks’ ESG risks, recently issued by the European Banking Authority and applicable from 2026, which recommend that a ratio should be monitored.

There are several ways that financial institutions can measure their contribution to the carbon-neutral transition. Societe Generale has implemented the following actions :



- Reduction in the amount of financing for oil and gas exploration, targeting an 80% reduction between 2019 and 2030,
- Reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the oil and gas sector by 70% between 2019 and 2030,
- Withdrawal of financing for thermal coal projects in 2017 and sharp reduction in the amount of financing for the sector, with an exit planned for 2030 (OECD countries) and 2040 (rest of the world),
- Closer supervision of the CO<sub>2</sub> intensity of our financing portfolio in the power generation sector, targeting a 43% reduction between 2019 and 2030. The CO<sub>2</sub> intensity of this portfolio is linked to the energy mix: achieving this target, which is in line with the NZE, the International Energy Agency's 1.5°C scenario, means reducing the share of electricity generation based on fossil fuels and increasing the share of clean energy.
- Alongside our decarbonisation targets, we have set new goals for contributing to sustainable finance, amounting to EUR 500 billion between 2024 and 2030. This means contributing even more to the financing of low-carbon energy, as well as its applications, i.e. low-carbon mobility, the energy efficiency of buildings and the decarbonisation of industry more generally.
- Societe Generale is particularly active in supporting its customers. In 2024, it was the fifth largest bank in the world for the financing of renewable energy projects (role of MLA, source: IJ Global Infrastructure and Project Finance League Table 2024).

### **Financing for Adani**

**According to the latest data from the Global Coal Exit List, Adani still plans to increase its coal-fired power generation capacity by 20,550 MW over the next four years in India. This is more than its current coal-fired power generation capacity of 17,510 MW. It also plans to expand its coal mining operations in India and Australia from 11.2 million tonnes per year produced today to more than 100 million tonnes per year in the future. These projects are completely contrary to the recommendations of climate science, which calls for a halt to all coal expansion and the phasing out of thermal coal by 2040 worldwide, in order to meet the 1.5°C target.**

**In addition, the Toxic Bonds Network published a report which collates evidence that funding into Adani Green Energy, supposedly the renewable energy arm of the Indian conglomerate, is being redirected, through collateralisation and related party transactions, to other Adani Group entities directly responsible for coal expansion projects.**

**In addition, the Adani Group has been embroiled in several international scandals in recent years. First it was accused by Hindenburg Research, an American investment research firm known for its short selling, of being engaged in a brazen stock manipulation and accounting fraud scheme over the course of decades. Gautam Adani has also just been indicted by US prosecutors for conspiring with executives of a company formerly listed in New York to devise a USD 265 million scheme to bribe Indian officials to boost their solar energy business.**

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**In view of all the abovementioned points about financial flows and links between Adani Green and the other coal development subsidiaries of the Adani Group, does Societe Generale promise to end its participation in bond issues and loans to the Adani Group and its subsidiaries, including Adani Green?**

**Response of the Board of Directors:**

In view of its legal and/or contractual confidentiality obligations, Societe Generale's policy is not to disclose information on transactions or companies. Therefore, it does not intend to comment on the allegations against Adani.

In addition, with regard to Societe Generale's exit from the coal sector, the financing granted by Societe Generale to Adani was in accordance with Societe Generale's Thermal Coal policy. We have also significantly reduced our exposure to companies active in coal mining or generating coal-fired electricity. We will continue these efforts in line with our commitment to reduce our exposure to thermal coal to zero, by 2030 for companies with assets in the European Union or the OECD, and by 2040 for the rest of the world.

**Question from Mr Romain Feraud, individual shareholder (question sent by email on 4 May 2025):**

**Why do the latest annual and half-yearly management reports of the Societe Generale FCPE not provide a breakdown of the portfolio, and all the transactions carried out during the relevant period?**

**Response of the Board of Directors:**

With regard to all the transactions carried out during the period, you will find, in the half-yearly report, details of the transactions by amount and asset category, recorded in Acquisitions or Disposals/Redemptions. In addition, the principal transactions for the year (acquisitions/disposals) are also available in the Fund's annual report.

With regard to the portfolio breakdown, you will find this information in the Fund's inventory, which is included in its annual report. Following the entry into force of the new chart of accounts applicable to collective investment undertakings, the half-year inventory has also been included in the 2024 half-year report, which can be consulted via Esalia.

Unitholders can obtain periodic information on the portfolio from the management company upon written request, in particular via the document entitled "Asset composition", certified by the Fund's Statutory Auditor.

All of these documents are drawn up in accordance with Articles 32 and 33 of AMF Instruction DOC-2011-21, applicable to employee savings funds.

**Questions from Ms Elisabeth Achard, individual shareholder (questions sent by email on 12 May 2025):**

**One of SG's priorities is customer satisfaction, a major contributing factor to SG's reputation.**

**What measures are being taken to improve Customer Relations in terms of staffing, training, skills and freedom to investigate in all departments, services and branches?**

**How were the problems resolved?**

**Is it reasonable to have to send two registered letters to Customer Relations, eventually receiving a reply three months later, which failed to address any of the points raised in the letters and wrongly blamed me for the cancellation of the SG bank cheque declared invalid by the Department of Public Finances for Haute-Vienne?**

**Response of the Board of Directors:**

The Societe Generale Group has made the improvement of customer satisfaction a priority for its retail banking.

Boursobank has been the French market leader in customer satisfaction for six years. Many initiatives within SG Retail Banking are carried out with a particular focus on the quality of service provided, employee availability and the digital experience for customers.

More specifically, one of the areas in which the Group is taking decisive action is to allow advisors to have more one-to-one time with customers, by simplifying their tools and facilitating all of the processes.

Each level of the organisation is committed to improving customer satisfaction. Almost 8 million questionnaires are sent out each year, customer interviews are conducted by all members of the Retail Banking Management Committee, and the key points raised by our customers are analysed thoroughly to continue improving how we respond to them.

As for the personal issue you mentioned, we have forwarded your questions to our Customer Service team. Their representatives will also attend the AGM, as they do each year.

**Questions from: Friends of the Earth France, a non-profit association (questions sent by email on 7 May 2025):**

**1. Response to the open letter signed by more than 700 students calling on the Bank to withdraw from the Mozambique LNG project**

**More than 700 students signed the open letter published last month calling on Societe Generale to withdraw from the Mozambique LNG gas mega-project.**

**In the letter, we set out the reasons for our indignation at the actions of TotalEnergies in Mozambique, as well as the human rights violations and allegations of atrocities committed against civilians by soldiers paid by the French oil major to protect its site.**

**As you well know, this is a pivotal moment for the future of the gas project. At the end of April, TotalEnergies announced that it planned to restart Mozambique LNG by mid-2025. Societe Generale, which in 2020 agreed to participate in the USD 14.9 billion loan to develop the project, now has a say in the matter: with funding having been frozen for four years, TotalEnergies needs the approval of its lenders if it wants to revive Mozambique LNG. So far, TotalEnergies has managed to obtain approval from two far-right governments: Italy under Giorgia Meloni and the United States under President Trump. But as we said in our open letter, “this disregard for the climate and human lives is not the only issue”. Other governments, including the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, have launched investigations into serious allegations of abuses allegedly perpetrated in 2021 by Mozambican security forces at the TotalEnergies gas site.**

**Societe Generale can be on the right side of history. Following this call to action, we are asking you today for an answer: Will Societe Generale continue to support the Mozambique LNG project and its relaunch, or is it committed to withdrawing from it?**

**If Societe Generale refuses to heed our urgent appeal, we will continue to oppose you and will do our utmost to stop you from recruiting new customers and employees from the lucrative student market.**

**Response of the Board of Directors**

Societe Generale has taken note of the open letter signed by more than 700 students in *Le Nouvel Obs*. Respect for the environment and human rights is one of Societe Generale’s core values and a cornerstone of its CSR policy. Societe Generale has tools and procedures in place to identify, assess and handle environmental and social issues throughout its business.

However, given its legal and/or contractual obligations, Societe Generale’s policy is not to disclose information on specific companies or transactions. In any event, we can confirm that this case is being closely monitored by the relevant teams and the feedback is being analysed in accordance with the applicable framework.

**2. Your bank’s presence in higher education**

**Societe Generale is developing an aggressive strategy of communicating with and canvassing students and graduates, as well as seeking to influence the higher education community. This translates as a financial presence and partnerships with numerous higher education and research establishments and with multiple players in student associations. This presence is not without reward for the Bank, allowing it to greenwash its image and giving it a stranglehold on the younger generations we represent, through the recruitment of new customers and employees.**

**This strategy raises questions when compared with Societe Generale's business as usual and its position as a leader in fossil fuel financing. We refer once again to its support for Total's Mozambique LNG project. As students concerned about climate change and human rights, as well as the independence of our universities and associations and the quality of our courses and the teaching provided, we are troubled by the dominant position of certain partners who continue to finance the climate chaos in which we are immersed.**

**To understand its strategy and to identify Societe Generale's presence within the student community, we would like you to be transparent about your involvement by disclosing:**

- **The list of partnerships that Societe Generale has with places of higher education (schools and universities), specifying the establishments, types of support and amounts involved, where applicable;**
- **The list of academic courses and research and teaching chairs funded by Societe Generale, including all public and private institutions, specifying the courses and chairs, establishments and amounts involved;**
- **The list of student associations and activities financed by Societe Generale – orientation weekends, festive events and galas, student offices, etc. – specifying the establishments, activities or associations and amounts involved;**
- **The list of campus events involving Societe Generale – conferences, promotional stands, stands at recruitment fairs, judging panels, tutored projects, coaching sessions, etc. – specifying the establishments and activities involved.**

#### **Response of the Board of Directors:**

Societe Generale forms partnerships with places of higher education and training to support education and research programmes, help students in their career development – particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds – and promote its business lines. In this regard:

the Bank funds teaching and research programmes by sponsoring chairs.

In France, it works with around 100 educational establishments and is involved in almost 300 actions a year, including forums, workshops and hackathons.

The bank also forms partnerships with schools to support students from the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods and encourage access to prestigious courses.

Societe Generale recruits a large number of interns, students on sandwich courses and volunteers for international experience (VIEs), facilitating their integration and helping them progress towards permanent positions.

Through its Foundation, the Bank contributes to building a more inclusive and sustainable society, notably by supporting education. The Foundation helps vulnerable young people so that they can pursue their chosen educational and professional paths.

#### **Questions from Ms Kelly Shields of the NGO Shareaction (question sent by email on 14 May 2024):**

**To whom it may concern,**

**We would like to submit this question to be answered by the board of directors in writing and published publicly, as part of Societe Generale's 2025 AGM.**

**This question is on behalf of ShareAction and relates to how the bank deals with human rights issues and ensures respect of Indigenous Peoples' rights. Banks are expected under international guidance to ensure clients have human rights grievance mechanisms and to either participate in a grievance mechanism themselves or establish their own. These independent bank-level grievance mechanisms are crucial, given communities may not feel mechanisms established by companies are accessible, effective, and safe. They can be a useful mechanism for Indigenous Peoples to flag or remedy potential rights violations. Indeed, the importance of bank-level grievance mechanisms is increasingly recognised in law. The French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law requires all large companies, including banks, produce a vigilance plan that includes an alert mechanism for severe human rights and environmental impacts. Under this law, BNP Paribas is currently facing legal action for allegedly failing to establish an adequate vigilance plan to prevent violations of human rights.**

**European peers are already moving in earnest to strengthen their protections. In 2024, ABN AMRO established a Human Rights Remedy Mechanism, allowing people who have experienced harm to enter into dialogue with ABN AMRO and any clients subject to the complaint. This is a mechanism tailored for resolving human rights related grievances. Its separation from whistleblowing processes enables the bank to institute a specific approach to governance, transparency, and mediation, building trust and supporting the fundamental rights of complainants.**

**We note Societe Generale has established a whistleblowing system, but this is not adapted to the unique needs of external stakeholders including local communities or Indigenous Peoples. A more tailored mechanism is needed to be considered effective under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Will the bank consider developing a human rights grievance mechanism to bolster its approach to human rights risks?**

**Response of the Board of Directors:**

The bank has set up different mechanisms to allow stakeholders to raise potential complaints:

1- The bank introduced a Group-wide whistleblowing system in 2019 to comply with the Duty of Care Act and the French Act on Transparency, the Fight against Corruption and Modernisation of the Economy (the “Sapin II Act”), and in 2023 further extended the system in accordance with the Wasserman Law. The whistleblowing system can be used by employees, Directors, shareholders, external and part time employees, subcontractors and suppliers with which a business relationship exists, and third-party facilitators. Whistleblowers can use the system to report any suspected potential or actual violation or attempt to conceal a violation of an international commitment, a law or a regulation; in respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, health and safety or the environment; and regarding behaviour or a situation that runs counter to the Group’s Code of Conduct. It is not planned in the near future to extend the whistleblowing system to other stakeholders.

2- The Group also set up a system for handling complaints from the various categories of clients (retail, professional and business) as well as third parties in connection with products or services offered by the Group.

3- In addition, for projects it finances, the bank applies the Equator Principles (EPs) to transactions falling in the scope of this initiative. For the most sensitive projects (Category A and B), the Group requires borrowers to create a grievance mechanism for the use of affected communities and workers as part of the Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) in line with Principle 6 of the EPs. The Group reviews and monitors the compliance with this requirement.

4- The bank is also involved in an ongoing process of dialogue with its stakeholders, through which it can receive alerts from third parties that are not covered by the whistleblowing system described above, if applicable. Such dialogue covers in particular human rights issues related to civil society through various exchanges with French and international NGOs